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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
"carved out an area of refusal" such that the District Attorney necessarily
knew, ahead of time, that the refusal would be reiterated after each question.
The holding in this case serves as an effective shield for a witness who
would otherwise find himself charged with criminal contempt just as often as
an ingenious prosecutor was able to think of a new way of approaching the
object of his questioning.
Similarly in Yates v. United States,43 where the defendant refused to
answer eleven questions about the membership of her friends in the Communist
Party on the ground that to do so would hurt them and their families, the
U. S. Supreme Court held that a prosecutor might not multiply contempts
by repeated questioning on the same subject of inquiry about which a recal-
citrant witness had already refused answers.
The Court in the instant case distinguished the refusal of a witness to
answer questions in a certain area which the prosecutor knows will go un-
answered, from the bonafide interrogation of the District Attorney in People
v. Saperstein,44 wherein the defendant refused to tell who were the persons
with whom he had spoken in five different telephone conversations. According
to the Court in the instant case, the prosecutor in the Saperstein case had to
continue questioning in order to find the limits of the defendant's refusal to
answer. After a witness's refusal to answer an initial question we are thus left
with the anomaly that the criminality of his subsequent refusal to answer
depends not on the witness's intent but upon that of the prosecutor. Of
course a witness may avoid this simply by spelling out after his first refusal the
precise extent to which he is in contempt of court, but such a course of action
might reveal precisely what he is attempting to conceal.
A better rule, perhaps implicit though unarticulated in the instant case,
is that a witness may be adjudged guilty of contempt only once for each
general subject concerning which he refuses to testify.
EXTORTION WITHOUT DIRECT AssERTIoN OF FORCE
In People v. Diogardi8 the defendants were convicted upon a jury verdict
for extortion and conspiracy to extort. The Appellate Division reversed the
judgments of conviction on the facts and on the law and dismissed the indict-
ment.40 On appeal to the Court of Appeals,47 the Court, examining the testi-
mony from the point of view most favorable to the people, had to determine
as a question of law whether there was a question of fact regarding defendants'
guilt which should have been let to the jury and not been disposed of by the
Appellate Division.48 The Court of Appeals held that such a question of fact
43. 355 U.S. 66 (1957).
44. 2 N.Y.2d 210, 159 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1957).
45. 8 N.Y.2d 260, 203 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1960).
46. 8 A3D.2d 426, 188 N.YS.2d 84 (Ist Dep't 1959).
47. N.Y. Code of Crim. Proc. § 519.
48. People v. Bellows, 281 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E.2d 238 (1939).
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existed and reversed the judgment of the Appellate Division, reinstated the
indictment, and ordered a new trial.
Four unions were attempting to organize the Kerin corporations, and a
picket line was established across the entrance of the company. Since the
wholesale stationery and office supply business, in which the Kerins were en-
gaged, was highly competitive, and any cessation of deliveries would force
them out of business, Mr. Kerin instructed his attorney, Coogan, to attempt
to solve the labor problem. Coogan met with one McNamara, a defendant in
the present action, who agreed to do something about the pickets at a cost of
between five and ten thousand dollars. Although infuriated at the exorbitant
price tag, Kerin agreed to talk to McNamara in order to prevent the closing
of his business. At that meeting McNamara promised these problems would
cease if Kerin would instruct his employees to join McNamara's Local 295,
pay to Equitable Research Associates, Inc., a "front" organization for the
activities of Defendant Dioguardi, $3500 to defray the expenses the various
unions had incurred in trying to organize the company, and retain Equitable
as a labor consultant at $200 per month. Kerin objected strenuously to the
payment of $3500, but was told to pay it or be harassed by constant picket
lines. On the following work day, no pickets appeared, and Kerin signed the
agreements with McNamara and Equitable. The evidence showed that all
the Kerin payments were deposited by Equitable and withdrawn immediately
after deposit by Dioguardi as "salary."
Extortion is the obtaining of property of another, with his consent, through
a wrongful use of fear which is induced by an oral or written threat to do an
unlawful injury to the person or property of the individual threatened. "9 Clearly
present in this action were the fear, the unlawful device to inflict injury, and
the property threatened, all necessary to prove extortion. Kerin was fearful
of having to close his business because of the picketing. The picketing, which
may have been completely legal in the beginning, even though it could have
caused the ruination of the business, became unlawful when it was employed as
a means to extort money from Kerin. The profits of a business are property
within the meaning of Section 851 of the New York Penal Law.60 The only
question remaining was whether the defendants actually "threatened" the
victim. The Appellate Court, relying on People v. Rollekr' found that in
order to constitute extortion the evidence must show a threat by the extortionist
which creates fear in the person threatened. In the present case, the prosecution
failed to show that the defendants threatened Kerin so as to create the fear in
his mind. No express evidence of the defendants' placing the pickets at the
company or their controlling them was offered.
49. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 850, 851.
50. People v. Weinseimer, 190 N.Y. 537, 83 N.E. 1129 (1907), affirming 117 App. Div.
603, 102 N.Y. Supp. 579 (1st Dep't 1907); People v. Hughes, 137 N.Y. 29, 32 N.E. 1105
(1893) ; People v. Barondess, 133 N.Y. 649, 31 N.E. 240 (1891).
51. 280 App. Div. 437, 114 N.Y.S.2d 85 (4th Dep't 1952), aff'd 304 N.Y. 905, 110
N.E.2d 735 (1953).
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The Court of Appeals rejected this theory of the extortionist having to
create the fear. So long as. a fear existed in the minds of the prospective
victims, and the defendants used that pre-existing fear to extort tribute, the
jury could find the necessary ingredients of extortion. Whether these defend-
ants were in fact union officials, and whether they did in fact form and control
the pickets were immaterial, as long as the jury was warranted in finding
that the defendants professed to the employer of their control over the picket-
ing, and that the employer was reasonable in believing the defendants. 52 It is
true that in this action, if necessary, the jury could have found actual control
over the picketing by the defendants, for before any money was paid, the
picketing ceased, and such control to end the picketing indicates the power
to continue it.
The defendants also argued that the crime committed was not extortion,
but bribery of a labor representative, which is a felony under New York law.53
The essence of bribery is voluntary giving, and the essence of extortion is giv-
ing under duress.54 The two crimes are mutually exclusive, for succumbing to
extortion is not a crime; whereas, succumbing to bribery is. The jury was
charged that if it believed, as the defendants argued, that Kerin was guilty of
bribery, then the defendants could not be guilty of extortion. 55 The determi-
nation of this isuue is solely a question of fact, and it cannot be said that,
as a matter of law, the jury could not possibly find the defendants guilty of
extortion.
ALCOHOLIC CONTENT OF DiNn SUJ'ECT OF CincumsTANTAL PROOF
In People v. Leonard the State charged defendant, the proprietor of a
tavern, with causing an alcoholic beverage to be served to a boy under
eighteen. 57 Defendant was convicted by a Court of Special Sessions, after a
jury trial, but such conviction was reversed by the County Court. The Court
of Appeals reversed the County Court.
Defendant's employee took the boy's order which was for rye and ginger
ale. Defendant, who was tending bar, made a drink and defendant's employee
then served it to the boy. He tasted the drink but did not testify as to what
it contained. The boy had with him three companions, all under eighteen,
who also allegedly ordered alcoholic beverages but their presence was not of
significance because the crime charged was for serving only the one boy.
52. United States v. Varlack, 225 F2d 665 (2d Cir. 1955); Callahan v. United States,
223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 US. 862 (1955).
53. N.Y. Penal Law § 380.
54. Horstein v. Paramount Pictures, 22 Misc. 2d 996, 37 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1942),
aff'd 226 App. Div. 659, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1st Dep't 1943), aff'd 292 N.Y. 468, 55 N.E.2d
740 (1942).
55. People v. Feld, 262 App. Div. 909, 28 N.Y.S.2d 796 (2d Dep't 1941).
56. 8 N.Y.2d 60, 201 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1960).
57. N.Y. Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65(1):
No person shall sell, deliver or give away or cause or permit or -procure to be
sold, delivered or given away any alcoholic beverages to (1). Any minor actually
or apparently, under the age of eighteen years; . ...
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